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Does Female Directorship on Independent Audit Committees   
Constrain Earnings Management? 
 
 
 
 
 
ABSTRACT.  This study examines whether the gender of the directors on fully 
independent audit committees affects the ability of the committees in constraining 
earnings management and thus their effectiveness in overseeing the financial reporting 
process.  Using a sample of 525 firm-year observations over the period 2003 to 2005, we 
are unable to identify an association between the proportion of female directors on audit 
committees and the extent of earnings management.   
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 1 
Introduction  
           The audit committee plays a key role in overseeing, monitoring, and advising the 
management of an organization in implementing internal accounting control systems and 
preparing financial statements.  In their role as overseers of the firm’s financial reporting 
process, members on the audit committees meet on a regular basis with the firm’s internal 
financial managers and outside auditors to review the corporation’s financial statements, 
audit process, and internal accounting controls (Klein, 2002a).  Prior studies have 
examined whether audit committee characteristics are associated with earnings 
management.  For example, Klein (2002a) finds that higher proportion of outside 
directors on an audit committee (i.e., audit committee independence) is associated with 
lower earnings management while Bedard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) document that 
audit committee members’ expertise also affects earnings quality.   
           This study focuses on another facet of audit committee characteristics, namely, the 
impact of female directorship on the effectiveness of audit committees in constraining 
earnings management.  Recently, Gul, Srinidhi, and Tsui (2007) using data for years 
2001 and 2002 find that earnings management is lower if at least one female director sits 
on the audit committee.  Their findings suggest that female audit committee members 
may be more ethical than males assuming that earnings management is an ethical issue as 
in Bruns and Merchant (1990).  However, Gul et al. (2007) do not consider many control 
variables like other audit committee characteristics in their research design, which could 
have impacted their results.  Thus, it is warranted to document further evidence on 
whether the gender of audit committee members affects earnings management.  
 2 
Furthermore, in contrast to  prior research (e.g., Gul et al., 2007; Krishnan and 
Visvanathan, 2008; Bedard et al., 2004), we employ the data of independent directors 
after the enactment of Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX)  to examine whether female directors 
on independent audit committees more effectively constrain earnings management than 
male directors on independent audit committees.  It is of practical value to investigate 
audit committees’ effectiveness by focusing on audit committees consisting solely of 
outside directors because U.S. listed firms are currently required to possess independent 
audit committees.  In addition, SOX has greatly expanded the responsibility of the audit 
committee for oversight of financial reporting.1          
           Using a sample of 525 firm-year observations over the period 2003 to 2005, we 
find that the proportion of females on the audit committee is not associated with earnings 
management.  The results are robust to various additional analyses.  However, the results 
should be cautiously interpreted as they may be affected by several measurement or 
operationalization issues.  Overall, this study contributes to the literature by providing 
further evidence on whether the gender of audit committee members affects their 
effectiveness in constraining earnings management and thus their oversight of the 
financial reporting process.  Since there is little research on this topic in the literature, our 
study sheds more light on this question.  This study also contributes to the research on 
audit committees by focusing on the data in the new corporate governance environment.  
                                                     
1
             For example, SOX Section 301 requires that the audit committee is responsible for discussing and 
resolving disagreements between auditors and management. Audit committee should also provide 
procedures to receive, retain, and treat complains regarding accounting, internal controls, or auditing 
matters. 
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Unlike prior research (e.g., Gul et al., 2007; Krishnan and Visvanathan, 2008; Bedard et 
al., 2004), we employ the data of independent directors after the enactment of Sarbanes-
Oxley Act.  Finally, our study has implications for regulators and legislators who 
legislate the composition of audit committees, and for boards of directors who can 
modify the composition of audit committees to enhance the monitoring of management’s 
financial reporting process (Beasley and Salterio, 2001).  
 
Background and research question  
           Earnings management has been defined as an intentional alteration of financial 
information to produce a predetermined result (Gaa and Dunsmore, 2007).  Firms may 
engage in earnings management for opportunistic purposes.  Healy (1985) finds that 
managers manipulate earnings to maximize their bonus compensation.  Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1995) contend that managers have incentives to manage earnings for their job 
security.  Haw, Hu, Hwang, and Wu (2004) document that earnings management is 
positively associated with the divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights.2 
Clikeman (2003) lists a variety of situations and pressures which can motivate managers 
to manipulate their companies’ reported earnings, such as meeting market expectations, 
contractual, and regulatory motives.   
           Earnings management involves the selection of accounting estimates and the 
structuring of transactions resulting in reported earnings which help the company or its 
                                                     
2
            A large divergence between control rights and cash-flow rights indicates a high likelihood of the 
expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders because the expropriation is less 
restrained by controlling shareholders’ own cash-flow stake (Claessens, Djankov, and Lang, 2000). 
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managers achieve their goals at the detriment of the external shareholders or other 
stakeholders, who are misled about the underlying economic performance of the 
company.  Bruns and Merchant (1990) establish that earnings management is an ethical 
issue, and Merchant and Rockness (1994) argue that earnings management practices raise 
the most important ethical issues facing the business profession.   
           As a part of the corporate governance mechanism, audit committees play a key 
role in constraining earnings management and enhancing earnings quality.  Extant 
research has documented that audit committee characteristics may affect audit committee 
effectiveness.  For example, Klein (2002a) reports that higher proportion of outside 
directors on the audit committee is associated with lower earnings management, 
suggesting that external audit committee members serve an important role in overseeing 
the firm’s financial reporting process and constraining earnings management.  Bedard et 
al. (2004) examine whether audit committee expertise affects earnings management.  
They measure audit committee expertise with respect to three aspects: financial, 
governance, and firm-specific expertise.  Using a sample of 300 U.S. firms in the year 
1996, they find that the financial and governance expertise of audit committee members 
are negatively associated with the likelihood of aggressive earnings management.  They 
also find that audit committee independence is negatively related to the likelihood of 
aggressive earnings management.   
           In addition to individual factors such as independence and expertise, prior 
literature suggests that other personal attributes including gender difference may affect 
ethical behaviour.  If earnings management decision is an ethical decision, it might also 
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be affected by the gender of the decision makers.  Mason and Mudrack (1996) propose 
two conflicting hypotheses regarding gender differences in ethics: gender socialization 
which argues that men are expected to respond in “less ethical” fashion to ethical 
situations than women because of the more communal values into which women are 
socialized, and occupational socialization which hypothesizes that there is gender 
similarity in employees as a result of occupational socialization.  However, prior research 
shows mixed evidence on whether gender differences affect ethical behaviour.              
           Two recent studies have provided some evidence on how gender composition may 
affect earnings quality.  Krishnan and Parsons (2008) investigate the association between 
earnings quality in companies and the proportion of women in the senior management 
ranks.  They use four earnings attributes including conservatism, smoothing, loss 
avoidance, and persistence to measure earnings quality.  Based on a sample of 770 firm-
year observations for years 1996 through 2000, they find that earnings quality is higher 
for firms with high gender diversity in senior management than for firms with low gender 
diversity in senior management.  Using a sample of 1,508 firm-year observations for 
years 2001 and 2002, Gul et al. (2007) find that earnings management is lower and 
earning quality is higher for firms with female directors or higher proportion of female 
directors on the board.  They also find that firms with at least one female director on the 
audit committee have lower earnings management and higher earnings quality.  Gul et al. 
(2007) argue that not only do women demonstrate greater risk aversion and ethical 
behaviour but they are also better at obtaining voluntary information which may reduce 
information asymmetry between women directors and managers.  
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            Even if gender differences may affect an individual’s ethical decision, little is 
known about whether gender differences will further affect group ethical decision made 
by the audit committee.  Earnings management is constrained when a majority of the 
audit committee believes that earnings management is occurring and that the committee 
should act against it.  If women are more ethical than men, female audit committee 
members are more likely to believe that earnings management is unethical and thus will 
seek to influence the committee so that a majority of the audit committee directors will 
choose to act against earnings management.  However, there is no definitive prior 
research to support that women exhibit greater ethical behaviour than men.3  
          The board of directors provides leadership in the development and implementation 
of corporate polices.  According to Lamsa and Sintone (2001), women leaders tend to be 
more people oriented, consultative, and democratic than men leaders.  Schminke, Wells, 
Peyrefitte, and Sebora (2002) examine how different leadership styles may affect 
individual and group ethical decisions.  They find that more active leadership leads to 
greater conformity in ethical decision.  Thus, women directors who are particularly strong 
in managing interpersonal relationships and adopt an approach that is more consensual 
and participative may be able to influence the behaviour of an entire board and a 
company’s management towards more ethical decision-making.  However, this assumes 
that women on audit committees are leaders possessing the above qualities, which may 
not be the case.  
                                                     
3
            For example, see the summary of mixed results provided in Ford and Richardson (1994). 
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          The motivation and ability of a woman director to wield influence on the audit 
committee in order to constrain earnings management depend not only on her ethical 
beliefs but also on a variety of individual and interpersonal factors within the group.  For 
examples, not only could there be variation among women directors in their financial 
expertise but there could also be variation among male directors in their beliefs about 
earnings management and abilities to resist arguments by a female audit committee 
director against earnings management.  
           In summary, extant studies document mixed evidence on whether women and men 
have differential ethical attitudes, standards, and behaviours and there are a variety of 
individual and interpersonal factors which could affect a woman director’s ability to 
constrain earnings management.   Whether female directors on independent audit 
committees are more inclined to constrain earnings management than male directors is 
likely to be an empirical question.  Hence, in this study, we formulate the following 
research question (RQ): 
RQ:  Does female directorship on independent audit committees constrain earnings 
management? 
 
Research design 
Sample selection 
           Following Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), we focus on firms included in S&P 
500 because these large firms have higher data availability on audit committee 
characteristics.  We collect audit committee members’ data  including gender, board 
service time, additional directorship, and audit committee size from the IRRC Directors 
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database updated in November 2006 for years 2003 to 2005.  We focus on years 2003 to 
2005 because we are interested in the corporate governance quality of independent audit 
committees after the enactment of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act, which was signed into law in 
July 2002.  Since the IRRC Directors database does not provide information about 
directors’ accounting expertise, we manually review proxy statements download from the 
SEC’s EDGAR to collect the accounting expertise data of audit committee directors.  We 
collect the data on executives’ gender from the Execucomp database.  We also collect 
data from the Compustat database to compute financial variables used in the analyses.  
After excluding firms with missing data, the final sample includes 175 firms that have the 
data for all three years 2003 through 2005.  Thus, there are 525 firm-year observations in 
the final sample.  Table 1 presents the breakdown of 175 sample firms with independent 
audit committees by industry.  We find that our sample involves 38 two-digit SIC 
industries.  Electric, gas, and sanitary services (12.0%), chemicals and allied products 
(10.3%), industrial machinery and equipment (8.0%), electrical and electronic equipment 
(7.4%), instruments and related products (5.7%), and transportation equipment (5.7%) are 
the most widely represented industries in the sample.  
Insert Table 1 about here 
 
Measurement of earnings management 
           Discretionary accruals are commonly used to examine earnings management in the 
literature.  Like other studies (e.g., Klein, 2002a; Chung and Kallapur, 2003), we measure 
earnings management based on discretionary accruals.  First, we estimate the cross-
 9 
sectional variant of the Jones (1991) model using observations in each two-digit SIC 
industry-year: 
           ACC = a0 1/TA-1 + a1 ∆SALES + a2 PPE + e                                                  (1) 
where  
          ACC = total accruals measured as the difference between earnings before  
                      extraordinary items and discontinued operations and cash flow from  
                      operations, deflated by beginning total assets,  
 
          TA
-1 = total assets at the beginning of the year, 
   ∆SALES = change in sales between year t-1 and year t, deflated by beginning total  
                     assets, 
 
         PPE = gross property, plant, and equipment, deflated by beginning total assets, 
 
           Like Klein (2002a), we use all firm-year observations on the Compustat over the 
period 2003 to 2005 and estimate the parameters in equation (1) for each two-digit SIC 
industry-year in which there are at least eight firms.  Discretionary accruals for the 
sample observations are estimated as the residual values from equation (1).   
           Second, we adjust estimated discretionary accruals by controlling for the impact of 
performance on the estimates.  Following Kothari, Leone, and Wasley (2005), we match 
each firm-year observation in the sample with a firm-year observation from the 
population with the same two-digit SIC industry-year and the closest return on assets 
(ROA).  The performance-matched discretionary accrual for each sample observation is 
computed as the discretionary accrual of the observation minus the discretionary accrual 
of the matched observation.  We use the performance-matched approach to adjust 
discretionary accruals because Kothari et al. (2005) show that the performance-matched 
discretionary accruals are less misspecified than other measures of discretionary accruals. 
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            Finally, we use the signed value of the performance-matched discretionary 
accruals to measure earnings management since according to Hribar and Nichols (2006), 
the use of unsigned discretionary accruals increases the threat of correlated omitted 
variables.  
 
Regression model 
           We estimate the following regression model for the main test of the hypothesis:  
           DAC = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB 
                 + β7CNI + β8DEBT + β9SIZE + β10NEGNI + β11CAC + β12SGROW 
                 + β13CASHF+ β14FIN+ β15BIG4 + β16OPCYC + β17VCASH + β18VSALE  
                 + Industry dummy + ε                                                                                 (2) 
 
where 
 
          DAC =   the signed value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based  
                        on the Jones model, 
   
       FMDIR = the proportion of female directors on an independent audit committee, 
 
        AEDIR = the proportion of directors with accounting expertise on an independent  
                        audit committee,  
 
        LTDIR = the proportion of long-term directors on an independent audit committee,  
                       where long-term directors are directors with the board tenure of 10 or more  
                       years,  
 
       ADDIR = the proportion of directors on an independent audit committee, who hold 
                        three or more additional board seats in other firms,          
  
      ACSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the  
                       independent audit committee, 
 
             MB = market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of the  
                       common equity to the book value of the common equity, 
 
            CNI = the change in net income between year t-1 and year t, deflated by the total  
                       assets, 
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         DEBT = debt, measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
 
           SIZE = size of firm, measured as the log of total assets,  
 
       NEGNI = a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and  
                       0 otherwise, 
 
           CAC = current accruals, measured by the ratio of total accruals to total assets,  
 
     SGROW = sales growth, measured as the change in sales between year t-1 and year t,  
                      deflated by sales for year t-1,  
 
     CASHF = cash flow from operations, measured by the ratio of cash flow from  
                      operations to total assets,  
 
          FIN = financing dummy, coded 1 if a firm raised capital for year t and 0 otherwise, 
 
        BIG4 = Big 4 auditors, coded 1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and 0  
                     otherwise, 
 
    OPCYC = operating cycle, measured as the sum of days accounts receivable and days  
                     inventory, 
 
      VCASH = volatility of cash flow, measured as the standard deviation of cash flow  
                      from operations for years t-2 through t,  
 
     VSALE = volatility of sales, measured as the standard deviation of sales for years t-2  
                     through t. 
  
           As in Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008), we define directors with accounting 
expertise directors as directors who are or were certified public accountants, auditors, 
principal or chief financial officers, controllers, or principal or chief accounting officers.  
We control for directors’ accounting expertise because Krishnan and Visvanathan (2008) 
suggest that it may affect accounting quality.  We define long-term directors by using 10 
years of board service time in a firm as the cut-off point because this level is close to the 
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average tenure of outside directors.4  LTDIR is included in equation (2) because director 
tenure is likely to affect audit committee effectiveness.  On the one hand, outside 
directors with long-term board service have greater experience and expertise to 
effectively monitor the management (Bedard et al., 2004).  On the other hand, however, 
long-term directors are less mobile and less employable (Vafeas, 2003).  The 
entrenchment of those directors may lead to lower governance quality.    
           Additional directorship could also have opposite effects in terms of governance 
quality.  Directors who serve on additional boards have greater expertise and reputation 
to work well (Bedard et al., 2004).  However, those directors are busy and thus may have 
lower monitoring effectiveness (Core, Holthausen, and Larcker, 1999; Fich and 
Shivdasani, 2006).  Like Shivdasani (1993), we define directors with high additional 
directorship as those who hold at least three additional board seats.  To control for the 
effect of additional directorship on audit committee effectiveness, we add ADDIR in 
equation (2). 
           We control for audit committee size (ACSIZE) in equation (2) as previous studies 
suggest that audit committee size may affect audit committee effectiveness.  Bushman, 
Chen, Engel, and Smith (2004) argue that smaller-size boards have the disadvantage of 
fewer advisors and monitors of management.  Moreover, it is probably more difficult for 
managers to exert influence over a large audit committee.  Thus, larger audit committees 
are likely to be more effective.  On the other hand, Jensen (1993) argues that in the 
                                                     
4
            The average board tenure of outside directors in the IRRC database is 9.54 years. 
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context of boards of directors, large boards could be ineffective due to higher cooperation 
costs and more free riding, suggesting that large audit committees may be less effective.   
           In addition to those audit committee characteristics, we also add several other 
variables in equation (2) to control for factors that may affect discretionary accruals or 
audit committee effectiveness.  We include MB because Klein (2002b) provides evidence 
that audit committee effectiveness measured as committee independence is related to the 
market-to-book ratio and Skinner and Sloan (2002) suggest that growth firms, proxied by 
high market-to-book ratio, are more likely to manage earnings.  We add CNI and DEBT 
because prior research (e.g., Dechow, Sloan, Sweeney, 1996; Klein, 2002a) finds that 
those variables are positively associated with earnings management.  We include SIZE 
because political costs, proxied by firm size, are associated with earnings management 
(Cahan, 2002).  Klein (2002b) suggests that firm size and negative earnings dummy 
(NEGNI) affect audit committee quality.  Thus, we also include NEGNI.  Like Chung and 
Kallapur (2003), we control for the effect of CAC, CFO, and FIN on discretionary 
accruals.  As in Bedard et al. (2004), we add sales growth and Big 4 auditor as control 
variables in the model.  Since Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) argue that 
OPCYC, VCFO, and VSALE are firms’ innate factors that may affect earnings quality, 
these variables are also included in the model.  Finally, we add an industry dummy 
variable which is coded “1” if a firm is from the six two-digit SIC industries that 
dominate in the sample and “0” otherwise to control for fixed industry effects.  
 14 
           To test the hypothesis, we first estimate equation (2) on pooled cross-sectional, 
time series data. 5  If there is no association between the proportion of female directors on 
an independent audit committee and the level of earnings management, the coefficient for 
β1 will be insignificant.  Otherwise, the coefficient for β1 will be significant.  The 
coefficient for β2 is expected to be negative.  The coefficients for β3, β4, and β5, could be 
negative or positive as these three audit committee characteristics probably have a duality 
in terms of governance quality.  Based on the literature, we expect a negative coefficient 
for β9, β13, and β15, and a positive coefficient for β6, β7, β8, β10, β11, β12, β14, β16, β17, and 
β18. 
 
Empirical results 
           Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of variables.  The mean for the signed 
value of performance-matched discretionary accruals (DAC) is -0.02, which is similar to 
the mean for the large sample reported in Kothari et al. (2005).  The average proportion 
of female directors on an independent audit committee is 16.0%, 16.7%, 17.4%, and 
16.7% for 2003, 2004, 2005, and all the three years, respectively.  The average proportion 
of directors with accounting expertise on an independent audit committee is 22.3%.  The 
average proportion of long-term directors (with board service time of at least 10 years) on 
an independent audit committee is 30.8% and the average proportion of directors who 
hold at least three additional board seats is 18.2%.  On average, there are about 4.22 
members on an independent audit committee.  In addition, we find that the mean number 
                                                     
5
           All continuous variables in the regressions are winsorized at 1 and 99 percent. 
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and median number of female directors on an independent audit committee are 0.71 and 
1.00, respectively.  The percentages of female and male long-term directors are 16.32% 
and 83.68% of total long-term directors, respectively.  The average tenure of directors 
with five to nine years service is 6.54 years for female directors and 6.72 years for male 
directors, while the average tenure of directors with less than five years service is 2.81 
years for female directors and 2.82 years for male directors.   
Insert Table 2 about here 
           Table 3 provides Pearson correlations between independent variables.  We find 
that the highest correlation coefficient is 0.50 between CAC and CFO.  The condition 
index for the regression model is 33.05.  To mitigate the concern for multicollinearity, we 
drop either CFO or CAC from the model.  In either case, the results do not substantially 
change.  We note a negative and significant correlation between FMDIR and NEGNI,6 
suggesting that female directors are less likely to sit on audit committees when firms 
incur losses.7   
Insert Table 3 about here 
           Table 4 reports main results of the regression that examines the effect of gender 
characteristic of independent audit committees on earnings management.  We find an 
insignificant coefficient for FMDIR (t-statistic = 0.45).  Thus, there is no significant 
                                                     
6
           We find an insignificant coefficient for FMDIR when we estimate equation (2) after dropping 
observations with losses.  Thus, a possible self-selection bias (i.e., possibility of females avoiding risky 
directorships combined with possibly greater pressure to manipulate earnings under loss conditions) does 
not affect our results.       
7
           We also find a negative and significant coefficient on NEGNI when we estimate equation (3).  
 16 
association between the proportion of female directors on an independent audit 
committee and the level of earnings management.  
           In addition, we find an insignificant coefficient for AEDIR (t-statistic = 0.45).    
After the enactment of SOX, each audit committee is required to have at least one 
accounting expert.  However, the disclosure of directors’ accounting background is 
voluntary in proxy statements and thus this measure of accounting expertise by reviewing 
proxy statements is affected by measurement error.  We find a positive and significant 
coefficient for LTDIR (t-statistic = 1.96).  This suggests that audit committees with lower 
proportion of long-term directors may be more effective in constraining earnings 
management than committees with higher proportion of long-term directors.  We find a 
negative and significant coefficient for ADDIR (t-statistic = -1.88), suggesting that 
directors who serve on more additional boards may be more effective in constraining 
earnings management.  We also find an insignificant coefficient for ACSIZE (t-statistic = 
1.17), suggesting that the size of audit committees may not affect the effectiveness in 
constraining earnings management.  Furthermore, we document that the signed value of 
discretionary accruals is positively associated with CNI, DEBT, and CAC, and negatively 
associated with FIN and OPCYC.  
Insert Table 4 about here 
           We also conduct several additional analyses to test the robustness of the results.  
First, we test the hypothesis by allowing for self-selection bias of female directors on 
independent audit committees.  The presence of female directors on an audit committee 
could be driven by some firm characteristics that also affect earnings management.  The 
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lack of significant evidence in the main test could be due to the self-selection bias.  To 
deal with this issue, we first run a probit model as follows:   
      Pr(FMDUM=1) =γ0 + γ1SIZE + γ2NEGNI + γ3MB + γ4ACSIZE + γ5BDIND  
                                   + γ6FMEXE + ε                                                       (3)          
       
where  
        FMDUM = the presence of female directors, coded 1 if there is at least one female  
                          director on an independent audit committee and 0 otherwise, 
 
          BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of outside directors on  
                           a board of directors,  
 
         FMEXE = the presence of female executives, coded 1 if there is at least one female  
                          executive and 0 otherwise. 
         
Based on prior research on the determinants of audit committee composition (e.g., Klein, 
2002b), we include firm size, market-to-book ratio, negative earnings dummy, and board 
independence in equation (3).  We add audit committee size in equation (3) because the 
presence of a female director is more likely for audit committees with more members.  
We also include the presence of female executives as they are likely to recruit female 
directors.  After the estimation of equation (3), we compute the Inverse Mills Ratio λ^ 
(Heckman, 1976).  Then we run the second stage regression as follows:  
          DAC = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB 
                    + β7CNI + β8DEBT + β9SIZE + β10NEGNI + β11CAC + β12SGROW  
                    + β13CASHF + β14FIN+ β15BIG4 + β16OPCYC + β17VCASH + β18VSALE  
                    + β19λ^  + Industry dummy + ε                                                     (4) 
 
           Table 5 presents results after allowing for the self-selection bias.  We still find that 
the coefficient on FMDIR is insignificant (t-statistic = -0.53).  Thus, there is no 
significant evidence that male and female outside directors on an audit committee differ 
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in their governance quality, even after we control for the self-selection bias of the 
presence of a female director on the committee.   
Insert Table 5 about here 
           Second, we use accrual quality instead of discretionary accruals to measure 
earnings management.  We conduct this analysis to examine whether the results are 
sensitive to using an alternative measure of earnings management.  Based on Dechow and 
Dichev (2002) and McNichols (2002), we run the following firm-specific regression:  
       ∆WCt = b0 + b1 CFOt-1 + b2 CFOt + b3 CFOt+1 + b4 ∆SALESt + b3 PPEt + εt        (5) 
where  
       ∆WCt = changes in working capital accounts, measured as the increase in accounts  
                     receivable plus the increase in inventory plus the decrease in accounts  
                     payable and accrue liabilities plus the decrease in taxes accrued plus the  
                     increase (decrease) in other assets (liabilities), deflated by beginning total  
                     assets,  
 
        CFOt = cash flow from operations, deflated by beginning total assets.  
 
Like Francis et al. (2004), we estimate equation (5) using data over the rolling eight-year 
window (i.e., year t-7 to year t) for each sample firm in year t.  The accrual quality 
labelled by ACCQ is measured as the firm-specific standard deviation of estimated 
residuals from equation (5).  A high value of ACCQ indicates a low level of earning 
quality, and thus a high level of earnings management.  
           The regression model to test the hypothesis using the accrual quality measure is as 
follows: 
         ACCQ = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB 
                       + β7DEBT + β8SIZE + β9NEGNI + β10SGROW+ β11FIN+ β12BIG4  
                       + β13OPCYC + β14VCASH + β15VSALE + Industry dummy + ε        (6) 
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As in equation (2), we include the audit committee characteristics in equation (6).  We 
also add several variables that may affect earnings management and accrual quality in the 
model.   
           In Table 6, we find that ACCQ is not significantly associated with FMDIR (t-
statistic = 0.33), suggesting that the proportion of female directors on an independent 
audit committee does not affect earnings quality.  We also document no associations 
between earnings management and other four audit committee governance variables, i.e., 
AEDIR, LTDIR, ADDDIR, and ACSIZE.  In addition, we find that NEGNI, SGROW, and 
VCASHF are significantly associated with accrual quality. 
Insert Table 6 about here 
           Third, we replace FMDIR in equation (2) by a dummy variable that takes the value 
of 1 if there is at least one female director on an independent audit committee and 0 
otherwise.  Similar to the main results, the dummy variable is not significantly associated 
with discretionary accruals.   
           Fourth, we examine whether the results are driven by fewer female directors on 
audit committees.  We compare the difference in earnings management between audit 
committees with at least two female directors and audit committees without female 
directors.  We replace FMDIR by a dummy variable coded “1” for audit committees with 
at least two female members and “0” for audit committees without female members, and 
then estimate equation (2).  Columns 3 and 4 in Table 7 show that the coefficient on the 
dummy variable (i.e., FMDIRD) is insignificant (t-statistic = 0.09).  Alternatively, 
FMDIRD is coded “1” for audit committees with at least 50% female directors and “0” 
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otherwise to compare the difference in earnings management between audit committees 
with at least 50% female directors and those with less than 50% female directors.  The 
results on this alternative dummy variable are reported in Columns 5 and 6 in Table 7.  
We still find a positive and insignificant coefficient on FMDIRD (t-statistic = 1.42).  
Thus, it is unlikely that our results are caused by a lack of female directors on audit 
committees.  
Insert Table 7 about here 
           Fifth, we examine whether the results are due to a lack of accounting expertise of 
female audit committee members.  We estimate equation (2) by replacing FMDIR by a 
dummy variable coded “1” for audit committees with at least one female accounting 
expert and “0” for audit committees without female directors.  Non-tabulated results 
indicate that the dummy variable is also not significantly associated with discretionary 
accruals.  Thus, a lack of female directors’ accounting expertise is unlikely to be a reason 
for the insignificant results. 
           Sixth, we conduct a diagnostic for the autocorrelation of our pooled regression. 
We find that the Durbin-Watson statistic is 1.788, which is over the critical value of 
1.782.  In addition, we estimate equation (2) for each of the three years to control for the 
potential autocorrelations of time-series data over the three-year period.  We still find no 
significant coefficient for FMDIR in any year from 2003 to 2005.            
           Seventh, we examine whether there are any heteroskedasticity issues in our 
analysis.  The White test shows that the test statistic is not significant.  Therefore, we 
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cannot reject the hypothesis that the variance of the residuals is homogenous and hence 
heteroskedasticity is less likely to be a substantive issue in our analysis. 
           Finally, we detect outliers by computing statistics such as RSTUDENT, H, 
COVRATIO, DEFITS, and DEBETAS.  We identify 35 observations as outliers based on 
these five statistics.  After excluding the outliers, we still find no association between the 
proportion of female directors on an independent audit committee and the level of 
earnings management. 
 
 
Discussion and conclusion  
           This study examines whether the gender of audit committee members affects the 
effectiveness of an independent audit committee in constraining earnings management.  
Our study, which covers a period following the enactment of SOX, finds no gender effect 
with respect to independent audit committees’ effectiveness in constraining earnings 
management. 
           While the results could suggest that there are no significant differences in ethical 
beliefs towards earnings management among male and female audit committee directors, 
there are, however, several possible causes for the observed null result.  Some female 
audit committee directors may believe that not all earnings management is unethical.  
Chong (2006) argues that earnings management is a logical result of the flexibility in 
financial reporting options and is not considered to be bad if the management uses 
earnings management to create a stable financial performance by acceptable and 
voluntary business decisions.  According to Scott (2008), some female audit committee 
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directors could believe that earnings management may be useful to protect the firm from 
the consequences of unforeseen events when contracts are rigid and incomplete.  
Similarly, there could be high variation among male audit committee members as to 
beliefs about earnings management and ability to resist the arguments by female audit 
committee members against earnings management.  Thus, it is difficult to test audit 
committee members’ real ethical attitudes towards earnings management. 
 Another possibility is that women are not uniform in their ability to influence 
other audit committee members.  Individual differences in this ability may mask a gender 
difference in earnings management beliefs and lead to observing the null results.  
Unfortunately, we cannot control for this effect in this study. 
           Like other studies, the results of this study should be cautiously interpreted 
because of its own limitations.  Although we have attempted to control for as many 
factors as possible based on prior literature such as accounting expertise, tenure, and 
additional directorship, and have used many control variables and alternative measures of 
earnings management, we may still have omitted other director characteristics and control 
variables, and have issues on measurement errors and variable operationalization that 
could affect the results.  Moreover, there are several possible results for the null result as 
discussed above.  Despite these limitations, this study adds to the ethics literature by 
considering the gender of directors on independent audit committees and extends the line 
of research on earnings management and corporate governance.    
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Table 1 
Breakdown of Sample Firms by Industry 
 
      
Two-Digit SIC Codes Industry Description Frequency Percent (%) 
13 Oil and gas extraction 7 4.00 
20 Food products 8 4.57 
26 Paper and allied products 5 2.86 
27 Printing and publishing 4 2.29 
28 Chemicals and allied products 18 10.29 
29 Petroleum refining  5 2.86 
33 Primary metal industries 5 2.86 
35 Industrial machinery and equipment 14 8.00 
36 Electrical and electronic equipment 13 7.43 
37 Transportation equipment 10 5.71 
38 Instruments and related products 10 5.71 
49 Electric, gas, and sanitary services 21 12.00 
53 General merchandise stores 6 3.43 
73 Business services 6 3.43 
Others   43 24.51 
Total  38 industries  175 100.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 27 
 
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics 
       
Variable N Mean Median Std Q1  Q3 
DAC 525 -0.017 -0.006 0.105 -0.064 0.040 
FMDIR 525 0.167 0.200 0.157 0.000 0.250 
AEDIR 525 0.223 0.200 0.233 0.000 0.333 
LTDIR 525 0.308 0.250 0.258 0.000 0.500 
ADDIR 525 0.182 0.200 0.199 0.000 0.333 
ACSIZE 525 4.221 4.000 1.099 3.000 5.000 
MB 525 4.226 3.103 4.754 1.978 4.686 
CNI 525 0.019 0.010 0.050 -0.000 0.027 
DEBT 525 0.201 0.192 0.127 0.109 0.285 
SIZE 525 9.260 9.250 1.167 8.355 10.071 
NEGNI 525 0.032 0.000 0.177 0.000 0.000 
CAC 525 -0.046 -0.042 0.042 -0.063 -0.024 
SGROW 525 0.121 0.097 0.164 0.039 0.175 
CASHF 525 0.110 0.106 0.065 0.066 0.147 
FIN 525 0.116 0.000 0.321 0.000 0.000 
BIG4 525 0.989 1.000 0.106 1.000 1.000 
OPCYC 525 132.136 107.600 97.363 75.764 150.295 
VCASH 525 0.028 0.021 0.024 0.012 0.033 
VSALE 525 0.082 0.054 0.088 0.028 0.101 
FMEX 525 0.061 0.000 0.106 0.000 0.143 
BDIND 525 0.780 0.800 0.118 0.727 0.875 
ACCQ 525 0.016 0.008 0.045 0.004 0.008 
       
          DAC =   the signed value of performance-matched discretionary accruals based on the Jones model, 
   
       FMDIR = the proportion of female directors on an independent audit committee, 
 
        AEDIR = the proportion of accounting expertise directors on an independent audit committee,  
 
        LTDIR = the proportion of long-term directors on an independent audit committee, where long-term  
                       directors are directors with the board tenure of 10 or more years,  
 
       ADDIR = the proportion of directors on an independent audit committee, who hold three or more  
                       additional board seats in other firms,          
  
      ACSIZE = audit committee size, measured as the number of directors on the independent audit  
                       committee, 
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             MB = market-to-book ratio, measured by the ratio of the market value of the common equity to the  
                       book value of the common equity, 
 
            CNI = the change in net income between year t-1 and year t, deflated by the total assets, 
 
         DEBT = debt, measured by the ratio of long-term debt to total assets, 
 
           SIZE = size, measured as the log of total assets,  
 
       NEGNI = a dummy coded 1 if net income is negative for both year t-1 and year t, and 0 otherwise, 
 
           CAC = current accruals, measured by the ratio of total accruals to total assets,  
 
     SGROW = sales growth, measured as the change in sales between year t-1 and year t, deflated by sales  
                       for year t-1,  
 
     CASHF = cash flow from operations, measured by the ratio of cash flow from operations to total assets,  
 
          FIN = financing dummy, coded 1 if a firm raised capital for year t and 0 otherwise, 
 
        BIG4 = Big 4 auditors, coded 1 if a firm is audited by Big 4 auditors and 0 otherwise, 
 
    OPCYC = operating cycle, measured as the sum of days accounts receivable and days inventory, 
 
    VCASH = volatility of cash flow, measured as the standard deviation of cash flow from operations for  
                     years t-2 through t,  
 
     VSALE = volatility of sales, measured as the standard deviation of sales for years t-2 through t, 
           
   FMEXE = the presence of female executives, coded 1 if there is at least one female executive and 0  
                    Otherwise, 
 
   BDIND = board independence, measured as the proportion of outside directors on  a board on directors,  
 
   ACCQ = accrual quality, measured as the firm-specific standard deviation of estimated residuals from  
                  equation (5).   
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Table 3 
     Pearson Correlations 
      (n=525) 
                       
 
          
Variable AEDIR LTDIR ADDIR ACSIZE MB CNI DEBT SIZE NEGNI CAC SGROW CASHF FIN BIG4 OPCYC VCASH VSALE 
FMDIR -0.01   0.06     0.09**     0.03 0.03   -0.01   0.00  -0.01   -0.13***    -0.05 -0.02 0.14***  -0.06 -0.08* -0.13***   -0.07 0.07 
AEDIR  -0.12***    -0.06    -0.01 0.06    0.04 -0.10** -0.18***     0.01 -0.08*    0.03 0.11***  -0.02 -0.05 0.12*** 0.14*** -0.00 
LTDIR   -0.14*** -0.18*** 0.01    0.04 -0.12*** -0.03   -0.04   -0.01   -0.01 0.10**   0.05 -0.03  0.03     0.01 -0.06 
ADDIR       0.08* 0.01 0.09**  0.03  0.08*   -0.04   0.03   0.04  0.02  0.04 -0.05 -0.06   -0.08 -0.02 
ACSIZE     -0.06  -0.04 0.19*** 0.27***   -0.04  0.06  -0.01 -0.11** -0.05 0.05 -0.09**   -0.05  0.06 
MB      0.07* 0.13*** -0.20***   -0.05 -0.01   0.01  0.37***  0.00 0.05 0.14*** 0.18*** -0.06 
CNI       -0.14*** -0.11*     0.06  0.10** 0.30*** 0.17*** 0.15*** 0.03   0.03 0.21***      0.10** 
DEBT        0.30*** 0.16*** 
  
0.12*** -0.24*** -0.37*** -0.06 0.03 0.09** -0.11*** -0.01 
SIZE           -0.04 0.17*** -0.07 -0.31*** -0.04 0.05   0.06 -0.26*** -0.08* 
NEGNI          -0.18*** -0.20*** -0.27***  0.00 0.02  0.04  0.09** 0.05 
CAC           -0.09* -0.50***  0.04 -0.05 0.24***   -0.03      -0.05 
SGROW             0.23***  0.23*** 0.02 -0.03 0.22*** 0.16*** 
CASHF              0.07 0.02 -0.18***   0.09**       0.02 
FIN              -0.02  0.04 0.08*      0.09** 
BIG4               -0.07 -0.08* 0.02 
OPCYC                0.27*** -0.14*** 
VCASH                   0.31*** 
                  
***, **, and * indicate a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).   
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Table 4 
Main Results 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- -0.097 -1.61 
FMDIR +/- 0.013 0.45 
AEDIR - 0.009  0.45 
LTDIR +/- 0.035 1.96* 
ADDIR +/- -0.042 -1.88* 
ACSIZE +/- 0.005 1.17 
MB + 0.000 0.53 
CNI + 0.190 1.76* 
DEBT + 0.118 2.85*** 
SIZE - 0.005 1.16 
NEGNI + -0.015 -0.49 
CAC + 0.588 4.16*** 
SGROW + -0.023  -0.75 
CASHF - -0.104 -0.94 
FIN + -0.031 -2.20** 
BIG4 - 0.038 0.90 
OPCYC + -0.000 -2.16** 
VCASH + 0.112 0.51 
VSALE + -0.014  -0.26 
Industry dummy +/- -0.008  -0.92 
    
N    525 
F-statistic    4.66*** 
Adj. R2     11.72% 
    
The regression model is as follows: 
      DAC = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB + β7CNI + β8DEBT 
                  + β9SIZE + β10NEGNI + β11CAC + β12SGROW+ β13CASHF+ β14FIN+ β15BIG4 + β16OPCYC  
                  + β17VCASH + β18VSALE + Industry dummy + ε                                                         (2) 
***, **, and * indicate a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).   
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Table 5 
Results after Allowing for Self-Selection Bias 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- -0.090  -1.48 
FMDIR +/- -0.032 -0.53 
AEDIR - 0.011 0.54 
LTDIR +/- 0.036 2.02** 
ADDIR +/- -0.042 -1.86* 
ACSIZE +/- 0.005 1.06 
MB + 0.001 0.57 
CNI + 0.189 1.75* 
DEBT + 0.119 2.86*** 
SIZE - 0.005 1.15 
NEGNI + -0.017  -0.59 
CAC + 0.585 4.14*** 
SGROW + -0.022 -0.74 
CASHF - -0.106 -0.97 
FIN + -0.031 -2.18** 
BIG4 - 0.040 0.95 
OPCYC + -0.000  -2.20** 
VCASH + 0.105  0.48 
VSALE + -0.016  -0.29 
λ^ +/- 0.006  0.84 
Industry dummy +/- -0.009  -0.94 
    
N   525 
F-statistic    4.46*** 
Adj. R2     11.67% 
    
The second stage regression model is as follows: 
      DAC = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB + β7CNI + β8DEBT  
                 + β9SIZE + β10NEGNI + β11CAC + β12SGROW + β13CASHF + β14FIN+ β15BIG4 + β16OPCYC  
                 + β17VCASH + β18VSALE + β19λ^ + Industry dummy + ε                                                    (4) 
where λ^ is the Inverse Mills Ratio based on the following first stage probit model: 
   Pr(FMDUM=1) =γ0 + γ1SIZE + γ2NEGNI + γ3MB + γ4ACSIZE + γ5BDIND + γ6FMEXE + ε          (3)                                            
where FMDUM is coded 1 if there is at least one female director on an independent audit committee  
and 0 otherwise.   
***, **, and * indicate a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).   
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Table 6 
Results on Accrual Quality 
    
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- 0.016 1.70* 
FMDIR +/- 0.002 0.33 
AEDIR - -0.001 -0.19 
LTDIR +/- 0.001 0.29 
ADDIR +/- 0.005  1.42 
ACSIZE +/- -0.001 -1.44 
MB + 0.000 0.04 
DEBT + -0.017                             -2.66*** 
SIZE - -0.001 -1.97** 
NEGNI + 0.023                       5.40*** 
SGROW + 0.013                         2.77*** 
FIN + -0.002 -0.73 
BIG4 - 0.007 1.03 
OPCYC + 0.000 1.24 
VCFO + 0.138                           3.94*** 
VSALE + 0.011 1.21 
Industry dummy +/- 0.003 1.91*        
    
N   525 
F-statistic    7.54*** 
Adj. R2     16.64% 
 
The regression model is as follows: 
    ACCQ = β0 + β1FMDIR + β2AEDIR + β3LTDIR + β4ADDIR +β5ACSIZE + β6MB + β7DEBT + β8SIZE  
                   + β9NEGNI + β10SGROW+ β11FIN+ β12BIG4 + β13OPCYC + β14VCASH + β15VSALE 
                   + Industry dummy + ε                                                                                              (6) 
*** indicates a significance at the level of 1% (two-tailed tests).   
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Table 7 
Results on Audit Committees with At Least Two or Fifty Percent Female Directors 
    
  
  Two Female Directors 50% Female Directors 
Variable Predicted sign Coefficient t-statistic Coefficient t-statistic 
Intercept +/- -0.072 -1.00 -0.094 -1.58 
FMDIRD +/- 0.002 0.09 0.029 1.42 
AEDIR - -0.003 -0.09 0.007 0.38 
LTDIR +/- 0.056 2.21** 0.032 1.83* 
ADDIR +/- -0.035 -1.02 -0.043 -1.93* 
ACSIZE +/- -0.001 -0.11 0.005 1.29 
MB + -0.000 -0.25 0.001 0.44 
CNI + 0.066 0.47 0.186 1.73* 
DEBT + 0.190 3.00*** 0.120 2.89*** 
SIZE - 0.006 0.99 0.005 1.18 
NEGNI + 0.016 0.44 -0.014 -0.49 
CAC + 0.530 2.72** 0.597  4.23*** 
SGROW + 0.003 0.07 -0.022 -0.73 
CASHF - -0.044 -0.27 -0.102 -0.94 
FIN + -0.039 -1.95** -0.031 -2.22** 
BIG4 -   0.034 0.83 
OPCYC + -0.000 -1.59 -0.000 -2.16** 
VCASH + 0.357 1.12 0.120 0.55 
VSALE + -0.060 -0.71 -0.016 -0.29 
Industry dummy +/- -0.017 -1.27 -0.008 -0.88 
      
N   262  525 
F-statistic   2.57***  4.78*** 
Adj. R2         9.75%       12.04% 
    
  
***, **, and * indicate a significance at the level of 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively (two-tailed tests).   
 
 
 
 
 
